In this paper, we propose a novel way to provide a fully homomorphic encryption service, namely by using garbled circuits. From a high level perspective, Garbled circuits and fully homomorphic encryption, both aim at implementing complex computation on ciphertexts. We define a new cryptographic primitive named reusable garbled gate, which comes from the area of garbled circuits, then based on this new primitive we show that it is very easy to construct a fully homomorphic encryption. However, the instantiation of reusable garbled gates is rather difficult, in fact, we can only instantiate this new primitive based on indistinguishable obfuscation. Furthermore, reusable garbled gates can be a core component for constructing 26
Introduction
Nowadays Cloud computing platforms are offering computation services to individuals, institutions, organisation, enterprises, etc. widely. Cloud computation is a generalisation technique of grid computation, which has revolutionised the traditional distributed large scale computation paradigm. Traditionally, we heavily relied on the local computation equipments like personal computers and small clusters to implement computation tasks, but this paradigm has some limitations such as costly hardware management, poor scalability and only local accessibility, etc. Along with the rapid development of both Internet and hardware techniques, cluster and grid computation and later on cloud computing became a reality. Many computation devices can now be organised to support a very strong computation ability, many originally unimagined computation task can |now be completed by distributed or parallel grid/cloud computation techniques like searching life information from huge collected space signals. These years by utilising the advanced techniques such as virtual machines and fast/broad/anywhere/anytime internet accessibility, cloud computation has emerged. Cloud computation enables the traditional local storage/computation/accessibility now as a service; it can support various levels of service: Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructureas-a-Service (IaaS), etc.
However, when data owners outsource their data to the cloud, they often worry about the privacy of their datum. Security is among the most concerned issues for cloud computation widely adoption (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Dutu et al., 2014; Guo and Xu, 2015; Thabet et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2016; Zhu and Yang, 2015) . A natural solution for the above issue is this: the data owners first encrypt their datum and then outsource them to the cloud. Although it solves the privacy issue, it poses another challenge to the cloud computation: in most cases data owners does not simply utilise the cloud to store their data but also utilise it to complete computation tasks, such as running data mining tasks on their data. However, when the outsourced data is in the form of encrypted ciphertext, how could the cloud run this data mining task efficiently? Fortunately we can solve this challenging issue by using several techniques developed from cryptography community. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is the most promising one among them, it can enable arbitrary privacy preserving computation on the ciphertexts, just like directly running computation on the plaintexts but with the results also encrypted. To put is shortly, it can support blindly computation but getting the corrected encrypted result. An example of fully homomorphic encryption service for cloud computation can be seen in Figure 1 .
1 Data owner Alice first encrypts her file by using her own encryption key and then outsource the encrypted files E Alice (file) to the cloud, she also outsource the computation task to the cloud, that is, an arbitrary function F, which can be seen as the data mining function or algorithm.
2 After obtaining the encrypted file and the data mining function F, the cloud runs the fully homomorphic encryption service on them and returns the encrypted result E Alice (F(file)) to Alice. Note here the computation task is implemented in a privacy preserving way, the cloud does not know Alice's file or the finally computed result. Also note currently fully homomorphic encryption cannot be implemented in an efficient way, that is also why users prefer to utilise the cloud to implement this task.
3 After obtaining the encrypted computed result, Alice can decrypt the encrypted result and obtain what she wanted to compute.
However there are two main challenges for the fully homomorphic encryption service deployment. The first one is how to design fully homomorphic encryption efficiently as currently most of them rely on the public cryptographic techniques, which are not efficient for many of such operations. Is it possible to construct fully homomorphic encryption based on symmetric cryptographic primitive such as AES or SHA3? The second one is how to design various kinds of fully homomorphic encryption schemes, currently most of them rely on the cryptographic lattice tools. Is it possible to construct fully homomorphic encryption based on classic computation problems such as RSA or DL problem? In this paper, we approach the solution of these two problems.
Our key observation is that Yao's garbled circuits techniques can be utilised to construct fully homomorphic encryption. Garbled circuits enable (very fast) secure multiparty computation; fully homomorphic encryption is also the most promising technique to implement secure computation on ciphertexts. Roughly speaking, these two techniques are both aimed at implementing complex computation on ciphertexts. Somehow surprisingly until now little effort has been made on bridging the gap between these two techniques. We give a first such attempt, namely, we define a new cryptographic primitive called reusable garbled gate, then based on this new primitive we show that it is very easy to construct fully homomorphic encryption. However, the instantiation of reusable garbled gates seems to be very difficult, we can only instantiate this new primitive based on indistinguishable obfuscation (iO), which until now has no efficient realisation. Below we first review Yao's garbled circuits and analysis the difficulty of construct fully homomorphic encryption based on Yao's garbled circuits, then we give our contribution and the detailed related work. 
Yao's garbled circuits
The technique of garbled circuit was first proposed by Yao in 1980s (Yao, 1982 Yao, 1986) to implement the secure two-party computation mechanisms. The core idea of this technique is the following: in the first phase, the sender (or the generator) first simultaneously garbled the inputs and the computed function's circuit, and then send them to the receiver (or the evaluator), while the receiver runs the oblivious transfer protocol with the sender to get the garbled results corresponding to his inputs; in the second phase, the receiver evaluates the circuit on the received garbled inputs and gets the output garbled results; in the third phase, the sender recovers the final function's output from the garbled results. In this process, the receiver can correctly compute the function on both parties' inputs while he knows nothing about the sender's inputs, and the sender can ensure the receiver has computed the desired function correctly without knowing the receiver's inputs. Furthermore, the receiver cannot know the concrete function he computed, thus achieving privacy preserving for the sender. This technique has some very interesting properties such as supporting arbitrary complex functions, being privacy preserving for the sender, being implementing very fast (garbled circuits can only use symmetric cryptographic primitives like hash functions and block ciphers), being very flexible. Thus it is among the most promising techniques to implement secure computation on large data sets like secure data mining, secure outsourcing computation task for mobile equipments, secure signal processing and even secure handling of big data. Figure 2 . In the first phase, the sender garbles the input bits of {0,1} n to random keys (like DES's keys), and then constructs a table consisting of four ciphertexts for every gate in the circuits (consisting of AND, OR and XOR gates). These four ciphertexts are the encryption of the gate's output key under the input keys (by using double DES encryption). For there are four inputs (00,01,10,11) for every gate, there are four ciphertexts for one table (or one gate). In the second phase, the receiver evaluates the circuits from bottom to top as following: he first decrypts the four ciphertexts at the bottom level to obtain the correct output key, and then uses these evaluated output keys to continuously decrypt the up level gates' four ciphertexts to again obtain the correct output key, thus finally gets the output keys of the output gates. In the third phase, the receiver returns these output keys to the sender, and the sender recovers the corresponding bits by using the bits-keys map he set up in the first phase.
Yao's garbled circuit has important applications in cryptography: on one hand, it is one of the foundational techniques for secure two-party or multi-party computation; on the other hand, by using only symmetric primitives like DES or AES block cipher, it can achieve very high efficiency, furthermore by using various optimisation techniques, its efficiency can be very impressive, thus it is a very popular basic tool for privacypreserving computation on large data sets and secure outsourcing computation for resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones. But Yao's garbled circuit has its own restrictions, for instance, it is not reusable. The sender needs to garble again the circuit and the inputs when the inputs are changed. The main reasons are the followings: if the receiver obtains the same two same in two different evaluations but for the same circuit, the receiver can easily decide the bits corresponding to these two evaluations are the same. Thus it is very important to realise reusable garbled circuits. Goldwasser et al. (2013) were the first to make a step forward in this direction, they constructed the first reusable garbled circuits based on functional encryption with fully homomorphic encryption, thus it is not efficient. Recently, Boneh et al. (2014) proposed a new cryptographic primitive named fully key homomorphic encryption and showed a concrete construction based on lattice, they also showed their primitive can be used to construct reusable garbled circuits with better size, but their result is also not efficient. Thus, an important research open problem is how to realise reusable garbled circuits efficiently.
Toward basing fully homomorphic encryption on Yao's garbled circuit
Gentry (2009) first constructed a fully homomorphic encryption based on the ideal lattice, which is a breakthrough result in cryptography. Since then, many wonderful results have been achieved. To give a clear picture on how fully homomorphic encryption works, here we give a very high level view on this primitive. Roughly speaking, a fully homomorphic encryption has the following three requirements: first, anyone can generate the cipheretexts corresponding to any plaintext; second, anyone (the evaluator) can compute any function on the ciphertexts; third, the evaluator has no idea on the contents of the ciphertext and the evaluated results.
It is a well-known fact that any computation function can be converted to a circuit. thus here we review some basic facts on circuits for computation of any function. Consider the computation of any function on bits 1 2 ( , , , ),
that is, functions that can be described as
where f is any function. Now the big problem for FHE construction is the following: how to privately evaluate the circuits? Note that an essential difference between garbled circuit and FHE is that the former can only be implemented on one function one time, while the latter can support arbitrary function on the same ciphertexts. Thus the biggest issue we need to solve is how to extend Yao's garbled circuit to handle any function.
Our contribution
1 For the first time we give a try to bridge the gap between fully homomorphic encryption technique and reusable garbled circuit technique.
Organisation
We organise our paper as following. In Section 2, we review the related work on garbled circuits and fully homomorphic encryption in detail. In Section 3, we introduce a new cryptographic concept, the reusable garbled gate. We also give its somewhat formal definition and its security properties. In Section 4, we show how to construct reusable garbled circuit and fully homomorphic encryption based on reusable garbled gate, also point out some promising result which maybe can be achieved. In Section 5, we instantiate the new cryptographic concept-reusable garbled gate based on indistinguishable obfuscation (iO) and roughly analysis its security. We conclude our paper in Section 6 with some interesting open problems.
Related work
Research results on the security of garbled circuits. Although the technique of Yao's garbled circuit has been put forward in 1980s, but its rigorous security proof only was given by Lindell and Pinkas (2009) a few years ago. In 2012, Bellare et al. gave a foundational work on garbled circuit, their formal analysis of the properties of garbled circuits need to satisfy, that is, authentication, secrecy and privacy. They pointed out, although there are existing some relation among these three properties, they are different. Furthermore, they proved Yao's garbled circuits are all satisfying these three properties. Yao's garbled circuit can be only proved secure in the semi-honest model, and not secure in the malicious model. By using "cut and choose" technique, Yao's garbled circuit can be strengthened to be secure in the malicious model. For Yao's garbled circuit is very efficient in practice, even using some optimised "cut and choose" technique, the strengthened Yao's garbled circuits are still efficient for many applications (Lindell, 2013) .
Research on the implementation of Yao's garbled circuits. After Yao proposed the garbled circuit, many researchers thought they are impractical for many AND/OR/XOR gates in circuits, which mean many encryption/decryption times, although this technique gave a firm foundation for secure two-party or multi-party computation. But in 2004, Malkhi et al. gave a breakthrough result, namely, they implemented a very practical twoparty secure computation system called Fairplay. The high efficiency owns to the only using of block ciphers/hash functions in garbled circuit. After that, many optimised techniques have been proposed, such as the free-XOR technique (Kolesnikov and Schneider, 2008) , the Garbled Row Reduction technique ), the flexible free-XOR technique (Kolesnikov, 2014 ), etc. Huang et al. (2011 implemented a very impressive garbled circuit system by utilising the parallel technique when generating the garbled circuits. In 2013, Bellare et al. designed a new cipher tailored for implementing garbled circuits and thus greatly improved the efficiency. As of today, we can safely say garbled circuits are among the most practical techniques to implement complex and natural secure computation task, such as data mining, signal processing, etc.
Research on the garbled circuits used for outsourcing computation. Gennaro et al. (2010) first explored how to use garbled circuits for verifiable outsourcing computation. A lot of work has been done after that, in recent years garbled circuits have been used for implementing secure outsourcing computation for mobile phones, practical secure multi-party computation, privacy-preserving data mining etc. In 2013, Carter et al.
implemented a very practical secure outsourcing computation system on mobile phone based on garbled circuits, since then, they also improve their work in several aspects.
Research on the reusable garbled circuits. Although the efficiency of Yao's garbled circuits is very high, but it cannot be reusable, and this heavily restricts its application. Goldwasser et al. (2013) first solved the open problem of constructing reusable garbled circuits, which was left open for almost 30 years, they relied on fully homomorphic encryption and functional encryption to solve the problem. Boneh et al. (2014) proposed a new concept named fully key homomorphic encryption and constructed more efficient reusable garbled circuits with small size. However, these two works are more of theoretical interest than practical implementation. Mood et al. (2014) discussed how to reuse part of the garbled circuit generation result to improve the practical efficiency of garbled circuit, this work is very interesting from a practical point of view, but it is not fully reusable.
Research on the fully homomorphic encryption. In 1978, Rivest proposed the concept of "private bank", which can be seen as a dream about fully homomorphic encryption and its application. Gentry (2009) first constructed a concrete fully homomorphic encryption based on ideal lattice. In his proposal, Gentry proposed a new way called Gentry's blueprint to construct FHE scheme: Bootstrapping + Squashing. Van Dijk et al. (2010) proposed a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on integers, establishing its hardness based on LWE problem and subset sum hard problem, this scheme is denoted as DGHV11, but this scheme has been proved to be insecure in 2014. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan (2011) based on only LWE assumption constructed a FHE scheme called BV11, in this work he introduced two new techniques: the re-linearisation technique and the dimension-modulus reduction technique. Later, Brakerski et al. (2012) proposed the BGV scheme, in this scheme before every gate evaluation, they first use the modulus reduction technique, thus reduce the noise amplification from exponential to linear. Furthermore, this scheme uses many other optimisation techniques and establish its security on the ring LWE hard problem, thus it is a highly efficient scheme. Later Gentry et al. (2012) proposed a new scheme named GHS, which can have a relatively large plaintext space. But as the BGV scheme, GHS scheme also needs to setup a maximal depth of the computed circuits when running. Gentry et al. (2013) gave the first identity or attribute based fully homomorphic encryption. Halevi and Shoup (2014) developed a software library named Helib to implement FHE schemes based on NTL library. A notable work on connecting FHE and GC is Gentry's i-hop homomorphic encryption , but this work has no intention to construct FHE on GC.
Reusable garbled gate

Reusable garbled gate for AND
By carefully observing the running of Yao's garbled circuits, we find that the garbled gate play an important role for garbled circuit generation. Instead of aiming at reusing the garbled circuit, what results we can achieve if the garbled gates can be reused? Surprisingly, if we can construct reusable garbled gates, then many wonderful goals can be achieved, such as fully homomorphic encryption and reusable garbled circuits.
Our idea on reusable garbled gate can be seen from Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 3 describes a garbled gate for AND. In Figure 2 , {A, B} and {C, D} represent the random keys for the two input wires, {X, Y} represent the random keys for the output wire. {A, C, X} is coloured with green, which can be seen as bit 0; {B, D, Y} is coloured with blue, which can be seen as bit 1. {A, B}, {C, D}, {X, Y} are all indistinguishable for the evaluators (receivers), in other words, the evaluators cannot deduce the underlying bit content from {A, B}, {C, D}, {X, Y}. The garbled table consists of four boxes, all the four boxes are locked by two lockers, and the contents in the boxes are the random keys for the output wire. In Figure 3, -0 locker) ]. If and only if the colours of the random keys for the two input wires are the same with the colours of lockers, the lockers on the box can be simultaneously opened and output the correct random key for the output wire. Also if and only if the types of the random keys for the two input wires are the same with the types of lockers, the lockers on the box can be simultaneously opened and output the correct the random key for the output wire. Example 3.1: For example, when the input random keys are {A, D}, only boxes 2,3 can be opened, and the output random key is X. For another example, when the input random keys are {B, D}, only boxes 1 can be opened, and the output random key is Y. Figure 4 describes a reusable garbled gate for AND. The main difference between Figure 4 and Figure 3 is the following. In Yao's garbled gate, the random keys corresponding to the two input wires are {A, B}, {C, D}, and the random keys corresponding to the output wire are {X, Y}, the secrets locked in the boxs are {X, Y}. In our reusable garbled gate, the random keys corresponding to the two input wires are {X1, Y1}, {X2, Y2}, and the random keys corresponding to the output wire are {X3, Y3}, while the secrets locked in the boxs are {X, Y}. {X1, X2, X3} are the randomisation of X which correspond to bit 0, and {Y1, Y2, Y3} are the randomisation of Y which correspond to bit 1. Note here can {X1, X2, X3} act as X, and it can unlock the locker locked by X; also {Y1, Y2, Y3} can act as Y, and it can unlock the locker locked by Y. Also note here the output {X3, Y3} are generated freshly and differently every time run the reusable garbled gate, only in this way we can ensure the input random keys are fresh and leak no information about its underlying bits. As in the Yao's garbled circuits, all the {X, X1, X2, X3, · · · , Y, Y1, Y2, Y3, · · · , } are indistinguishable to the evaluators. Also the garbled table consists of four boxes, all the four boxes are locked by two lockers, and the contents in the boxes are the source random keys for the output wire. In Figure 4 
, the boxes from up to down are locked by [blue locker (type-1 locker), blue locker (type-1 locker)], [green locker (type-0 locker), blue locker (type-1 locker)], [blue locker (type-1 locker), green locker (type-0 locker) ], [green locker (type-0 locker), green locker (type-0 locker)].
If and only if the colours of the random keys for the two input wires are the same with the colours of lockers, the lockers on the box can be simultaneously opened and output the randomisation of the correct key for the output wire. Also if and only if the types of the random keys for the two input wires are the same with the types of lockers, the lockers on the box can be simultaneously opened and output the randomisation of the correct key for the output wire. Example 3.2: For example, when the input random keys are {X2, Y1}, only boxes 2,3 can be opened, and the output is the randomisation of the correct key X, which is X3. For another example, when the input random keys are {Y2, Y1}, only boxes 1 can be opened, and the output is the randomisation of the correct key Y, which is Y3. Note here when {X3, Y3} is then used as the input random keys, only boxes 2,3 can be opened, and the output is a new randomisation of the correct key X, which can be denoted as X4. Figure 4 can be taken as reusable garbled AND gate, similarly there can exist reusable garbled OR gate and XOR gate, these three kinds of gate are enough to describe any function, for XOR/AND/OR can be combined to express any function.
A somewhat formal definition of reusable garbled gate for AND Definition 3.3: We first define a Rand algorithm, which takes as inputs (inputbit, Trapdoor), and then maps the input bit to be a random key by using Trapdoor, it can be described as following: 0 → Rand(0) and 1 → Rand(1). Note every time we invoke the Rand algorithm, the output random key is afresh one, that is, the output random keys are all different. Then we give a somewhat formal definition of Reusable Garbled Gate (RGG) for AND, it consists of the following algorithms:
1 Generation (AND, Inputl, Input2, Trapdoor 
InputKey1
InputKey2 OutputKey
Rand (1) Rand (1) Rand (1) Rand (1) Rand (0) Rand (0) Rand (0) Rand (1) Rand (0) Rand ( 
Similarly, we can give a somewhat formal definition of Reusable Garbled Gate (RGG) for XOR and OR.
Remark 3.4: Here we emphasise that this definition is just the "gold" goal we want to achieve, indicating no way on how to construct such "gold" reusable garbled gates. If such "gold" reusable garbled gates can be easily achieve, then it is also easy to construct fully homomorphic encryption, while we know this is not the fact until now. So such "gold" reusable garbled gates are difficult to be instantiated. But we also emphasis here that such concept of "gold" reusable garbled gates is already valuable, which can guide us to a new way on constructing fully homomorphic encryption.
Remark 3.5: This table of four ciphertexts can be omitted if the data owners and evaluator can directly simulate the process of Generation, Evaluation and Recover. For example, proxy re-encryption maybe can be used to simulate the process of Evaluation without any operation of Decryption. In our point of view, searchable encryption with probabilistic tokens or ORAM techniques maybe can be used to construct such "gold" reusable garbled gates. Generally we can view these "gold" reusable garbled gates as the encoding-evaluating-decoding process. We also note here for supporting arbitrary computation, the outputs of the Rand algorithm must support AND, OR, XOR operation simultaneously. It is no use if this encoding process only support one type of operation, and the key challenge is supporting AND, OR, XOR operation simultaneously for this encoding-evaluating-decoding process. Example 3.6: Here we try to give an example of construction based on the idea of obfuscation, which can be seen in the Figure 5 . We describe a very simple evaluation of an AND gate by the evaluator.
1 First the data owner constructs an obfuscated program of input encoding or input transformation (the left figure) , and an obfuscated program of gate evaluation or decryption of reusable garbled gates (the right figure) , which embedded a key K for pseudorandom function PRF. Then he publishes these obfuscated program as the public keys. For example, data owner's input bits are 0 and 1, he can encode them as 
. This output key then is returned to the data owner (Also note here the output key can be used as an input for next-gate-evaluation if the evaluated function is more complex than a simple AND gate).
3 After obtaining the output key, the data owner can recover the output bit by first computing 0
 and then mapping this secret key k 0 to bit 0. Remark 3.7: Roughly speaking, the security of this construction heavily relies on the security of obfuscation, that is, the evaluator can implement the evaluating without knowing the underlying secret key K, k 0 , k 1 by just invoking the obfuscated program. Fortunately, now we can have some positive and concrete construction on indistinguishable obfuscation, such as in Miles et al. (2016) . Similarly, it is easy to derive the properties the RGG for OR, XOR should satisfy, here we omit it.
FHE and RGC based on RGG
FHE based on RGG
Here we describe how to construct FHE based on RGG, which can be seen in Figure 6. 1 First, the data owner constructs three kinds of reusable garbled gates: AND, OR and XOR and publish them as public parameters.
2 Second, he transforms his plaintext bits 1 2 ( , , , )
to be the keys corresponding to 1 2 ( , , , ),
which is actually the ciphertexts. He also outsource the input ciphertexts to the evaluator (can be the cloud).
4 Fourth, the evaluator reconstruct the Yao-style circuit from reusable garbled gates.
After obtaining the input bits' corresponding input ciphertexts, it runs the reusable garbled gates and thus can get the final output. Finally it returns this output to the data owner.
5 Fifth, the final output are also keys representing 0 or 1, which are not known by the evaluator, but the data owner can recover the results by using trapdoor which maps the keys to 0 or 1. 
RGC based on RGG
Here we describe how to construct RGC based on RGG, which can be seen in Figure 7. 1 First, the data owner constructs three kinds of reusable garbled gates: AND, OR and XOR and publish them as public parameters.
2 Second, he also transforms his plaintext bits
which is actually the ciphertexts. Assume the function corresponding to the reusable garbled circuits is f, he outsources the input ciphertexts and f to the evaluator (can be the cloud).
4 Fourth, the evaluator reconstruct the Yao-style reusable garbled circuit from reusable garbled gates and the input ciphertexts, it runs the reusable garbled gates and thus can get the final output. Finally it returns this output to the data owner.
5 Fifth, the final output are also keys representing 0 or 1, which are not known by the evaluator, but the data owner can recover the results by using trapdoor which map the keys to 0 or 1. 
Construction
In this section we give a concrete construction for CSPLE based on indistinguishable obfuscation (iO) (Sahai and Waters, 2014) . Let PRG be a pseudo-random generator that maps 2 {0,1} {0,1} .
   Let PRF be a puncturable PRF that takes inputs of 2λ bits and outputs l bits. We describe our CSPLE schemes as following: , , , K K K the user can map the keys (the ciphertexts) to the plaintext bits, thus he can recover the correct computation result.
Remark 5.1: Note here we although simulate Yao-style garbled circuit, but our construction has an important difference with them, that is, our protocol can not achieve the authenticity property for computation result (Bellare et al., 2012) . But we point out fully homomorphic encryption does not include authenticity property as its basic requirement, that is, Gentry's FHE also do not guarantee authenticity property for computation result (Gentry, 2009) .
Correctness and security analysis
Correctness. As an example, we derive the correctness for AND gate as Figure 11 . Similarly we can verify the correctness for other gates OR, XOR, here we omit it. By iteratively invoking the gates for AND/OR/XOR corresponding to the structure of the needed computed function's circuit, we can easily obtain the final correct computation result. Security. Indistinguishable obfuscation has been proved to be secure if two obfuscated programs have the same functionality, while our design is satisfied. The puncturable pseudo random function is a key object for proving security for indistinguishable obfuscation, which we also use in our design. Proof. We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original IND-CPA security game. We prove that the attacker's advantage must be the negligibly close between each successive hybrid and that the attacker has zero advantage in the final experiment.
• Hyb 0 : In the first hybrid the following game is played. 
is chosen randomly.
• Hyb 1 : Is the same as Hyb 0 with the exception that t* is chosen randomly in {0,1} 2λ . Note that r is no longer in the attacker's view and does not need to be generated.
• Hyb 2 : Is the same as Hyb 1 except that the public key is created as an obfuscation of the Program Input Transformation of Figure 12 . Note that with all but negligible probability t* is not in the image of the PRG.
• Hyb 3 : Is the same as Hyb 2 except the challenge ciphertext is given as
We first argue that the advantage of any poly-time attacker in guessing the bit b in Hyb 1 must be negligibly close to the attacker's advantage in Hyb 0 . Otherwise, we can easily create a reduction algorithm B that breaks the security of the pseudorandom generator. This conclusion can be easily derived from observing the difference between Hyb 1 and Hyb 0 , we omit the details here. Next, we argue that the advantage for any poly-time attacker in guessing the bit b must be negligibly close in hybrids Hyb 2 and Hyb 1 . We first observe that with all but negligible probability that the input/output behaviour of Program Input Transformation and Program Input Transformation* are identical when t * is chosen at random. The reason is that with probability
is not in the image on the PRG. Thus, with high probability for all inputs neither program can call on PRF(K 0 , t*). Therefore, puncturing t* out from the key K will not effect input/output behaviour. Therefore, if there is a difference in advantage, we can create an algorithm B that breaks indistinguishability security for obfuscation. We now argue that the advantage for any poly-time attacker in guessing the bit b must be negligibly close in hybrids Hyb 3 and Hyb 2 . Otherwise, we can create a reduction algorithm B that breaks the selective security of the constrained pseudorandom function at the punctured points. This conclusion can be easily derived from observing the difference between Hyb 3 and Hyb 2 and the property of punctured pseudorandom function, we omit the details here.
Finally, we observe that any attacker's advantage in Hyb 3 must be 0, since it conveys no information about b. Since the advantage of all poly-time attacker's are negligibly close in each successive hybrid, this proves IND-CPA security of Program Input Transformation.
Next we prove Program Decryption of Reusable Garbled Gates's security, here we can regard this transformation as a public key decryption-then-randomised-encryption algorithm. Proof. We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original IND-CPA security game. We prove that the attacker's advantage must be the negligibly close between each successive hybrid and that the attacker has zero advantage in the final experiment.
Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time we try to bridge the gap between fully homomorphic encryption and Yao's garbled circuit. For this purpose, we propose an interesting new primitive: reusable garbled gate and show how to easily provide fully homomorphic encryption and reusable garbled circuit service based on it. However, the instantiation of this primitive is very difficult. We can only give an instantiation based on the recently new concept of indistinguishable obfuscation, which is not efficient until now. There are many interesting open problems deserved further exploring such as:
1 The most important open problem is how to instantiate reusable garbled gate for AND, XOR, OR efficiently? Can it be efficient instantiated by symmetric primitives like DES or AES?
2 Can the indistinguishable obfuscation just be used in the Setup phase instead of using in every running of reusable garbled gate? If we can achieve this, then the computation cost for running fully homomorphic encryption and reusable garbled circuit will be reduced greatly.
